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The Art of Fugue: Heidegger on Rhythm
David Nowell-Smith
During his short lecture on Stefan George’s “Das Wort,” Heidegger 
turns to another of George’s “songs,” “In stillste ruh.” After reading 
the poem aloud, he o&ers the following “short remark:”
The rhythm of this song is as marvellous as it is clear. 
It is enough to suggest it with a short remark. Rhythm, 
rhuthmos, does not mean flux and flowing, but rather 
structure [Fügung]. Rhythm is what is at rest, what 
structures [ fügt] the movement [Be-wegung] of dance 
and song, and thus lets it rest within itself. Rhythm 
bestows rest. In the song we just heard, the structure 
shows itself if we pay heed to the one fugue [Fuge] 
which sings to us, in three forms, in three stanzas: se-
cure soul and sudden sight, stem and storm, sea and 
shell.1
Rhythm, removed both from its literary critical usage and from the 
philosophical tradition that has interpreted it as “flux,” would, through 
its close working of the cognates of fügen, trace the movedness of be-
ing. But the particular rhythm through which this movedness becomes 
discernable is the “fugue” [Fuge] of the poem itself. This invites the 
question – how does the rhythm that issues from the movement and 
rest of being interact with “poetic” rhythm more broadly?
 This is the question that the current essay will pose; in so doing 
it will return to that vexed issue of Heidegger’s disregard for literary 
criticism. The rhythm Heidegger outlines in his discussion of George 
is far removed from “rhythm” as literary critics would envisage it: the 
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patterning of the “suprasegmentals” of speech (which, for purposes of 
disambiguation, I will henceforth term “prosody”). Indeed, he situ-
ates the poem’s “rhythm” in its tropological development, from “secure 
soul” to “sea and shell;” what literary critics would call rhythm is point-
edly absent. Elsewhere he is more explicit in this regard. The discussion 
of Georg Trakl’s “Ein Winterabend” begins with the laconic remark: 
“Meter and rhyme pattern can be defined accurately according to the 
schemes of metrics and poetics,” but such “schemes” leave us “confined 
by the notion of language that has prevailed for thousands of years.”2 
The metrical patterning of the sounds of language independently of 
their sense treats language as a semantic content transmitted through 
sensuous tokens, whereas Heidegger would refigure verbal language as 
a “sounding” anterior to the sound-sense split.3 And in the 1953 lecture 
on “Language in the Poem,” again on Trakl, he says that the “site of 
the poem [Gedicht], as the source of the animating wave [bewegende 
Woge], holds within it the veiled essence of what – to metaphysical-
aesthetic representation – can at best appear as rhythm.”4 “Rhythm” 
(i.e. prosody) is a metaphysical-aesthetic derivation of the animating 
wave that sets language itself into motion.
 Heidegger’s choice of Fuge to describe George’s poem is particularly 
intriguing: it is a well-known musical form, but also alludes to what he 
elsewhere thematizes as the “jointure” of beings in presence. It o&ers 
a point of contact between the poem’s formal palette and its claim to 
disclose the shape of the presencing of beings as a whole. The following 
pages will probe Fuge as it is deployed to understand the peculiar tem-
porality of beings in their presencing, but also as it describes the way an 
artwork coheres and the “unifying element” by which verbal language 
and the disclosive “gathering” are bound together in the “saying” [Sage] 
of language. Poetry comes to be conceived by Heidegger as a kind of 
threshold between two modes of rhythmicity: the oscillations between 
presencing and absencing on the one hand, and prosody on the other. In 
the final section I will ask how these two di&erent experiences of rhythm 
intersect – are “joined,” even – in Heidegger’s readings of poetry.
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FUGE : JOINTURE AND FUGUE
In the second section of Being and Time, Heidegger proposes not simply 
that being is temporal, but that time is being. But to substantiate this 
claim requires that we reconceive of both “being” (which is no longer 
a transcendental substrate, “big Being,” but rather the shape of beings’ 
disclosing themselves “in their being”) and “time.”5 Time had been 
portrayed by philosophers from Aristotle to Hegel as a series of discrete 
“nows.” For Heidegger it is that movement through which what appears 
“now” emerges from out of, and withdraws into, the double absence of 
its having-been [Gewesenheit] and its futurity [Zukünftigkeit].6 
 When Heidegger discusses rhuthmos itself, in the 1939 lecture on 
Aristotle’s Physics, the concern remains that of the temporal character 
of beings’ self-disclosure. Heidegger translates rhuthmos as “articulat-
ing, impressing, fitting, and forming”: Gliederung, Prägung, Fügung, 
und Verfassung.7 O&ering “articulation” as a possible translation recalls 
the discussion of language in Being and Time, where “discourse is the 
articulation of intelligibility”: in one gesture it binds entities together 
in an intelligible whole and di&erentiates them, both synthesis and 
diairesis.8 In translating rhuthmos as Fügung (translated by Sheehan as 
“fitting”), Heidegger anticipates the account of rhythm we saw in his 
discussion of George’s “In stillste ruh.”
 The initial concern in the discussion of rhuthmos in the Aristotle 
lecture is Antiphon’s claim that the proton arruthmiston, that which is 
untouched by the temporality of appearance, is what is “most being” 
(even if, for precisely this reason, what is “most being” will never en-
ter presence). Aristotle, Heidegger argues, inverts this: rhuthmos does 
not describe entities that appear temporally, but rather indicates the 
temporal structure by which the entity remains within appearance as 
bounded by the absences of non-being. It is only in rhuthmos that a be-
ing can articulate itself, that is, set itself into relation with its surrounds, 
and take an intelligible form – and thus be said “to be.” For Antiphon, 
what is “most being” cannot admit of a change of state, as this would 
amount to saying that its being is incomplete; yet if “to be” means “to 
enter into presence,” then what is most-being must continually be in 
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movement if it is to remain in being. Rhuthmos is not flux, instability, 
but rather that which structures a being’s appearance within time, that 
which allows it to enter into presence as an intelligible “such-and-such” 
that we can encounter in an “open” region.
 Heidegger attempts to grasp something similar in his gloss of dike 
in “Anaximander’s Saying.” In place of the standard translations of dike 
as “penalty” or “damages,” Heidegger turns to another cognate of fügen: 
“dike, thought out of being as presencing, is the ordering, jointure-giving 
order [ fugend-fügende Fug].”9 In order for beings to enter into presence, 
they must be “joined” in such a way that they are intelligible and, for 
Heidegger, this jointure is paradigmatically temporal, adjoining “all 
that presences between a twofold absence (arrival and departure).” All 
jointure, Heidegger stipulates, is a “jointure of the while.”10 
 Here too Heidegger is building on Being and Time’s exposition of 
the three temporal ecstases. Just as the presencing of beings cannot 
be situated in a discrete series of “nows,” Heidegger distinguishes the 
“while” from mere “continuation.” However, Heidegger sees Anaxi-
mander’s fragment to stage a contest between these two conceptions 
of time. As an entity attempts to persist in presence, it “concerns itself 
no longer with the other things that are present” and so “stands in 
dis-jointure” [in der Un-Fuge]: it presences “without and against the 
jointure of the while.”11 In dis-jointure, presence is no longer a “while” 
bounded by a double absence, but rather “continuation”: what will later 
be conceptualized by Plato as “constant presence.” This “metaphysi-
cal” interpretation of presencing as constant presence is, then, already 
latent in Anaximander’s fragment; but for Anaximander, Heidegger 
argues, dis-jointure becomes the mode in which the being in fact “gives 
jointure.” In other words, the being’s resistance to its temporal finitude 
becomes the mode through which it inhabits time as a finite being.
 In the glosses of both rhuthmos and dike, then, Heidegger o&ers 
an account of how beings constitute themselves temporally through 
their engagement with absence; both take issue with the conception 
of time in which what is “most being” is characterized by “constant 
presence.” Central to this argument is the claim that the division of 
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time into discrete units transforms the basic fact that we encounter 
the auto-disclosure of entities temporally into an insurmountable 
enigma; the intelligibility of the world is put “out of joint.” This argu-
ment recurs throughout Heidegger’s work, not simply in discussions of 
temporality but also regarding any attempt to break the meaningful 
fabric of experience down into “sense data.” In Being and Time he 
says: “‘Initially’ we never hear noises and complexes of sound, but the 
creaking wagon, the motorcycle. We hear the column on the march, 
the north wind, the woodpecker tapping, the crackling fire.”12 In The 
Principle of Reason, thirty years later, he revisits this argument: “Of 
course we hear a Bach fugue with our ears, but if we leave what is 
heard only at this, with what strikes the tympanum as sound waves, 
then we can never hear a Bach fugue.”13 Just as Bach’s fugue cannot 
be broken down into its constituent parts and remain the artwork 
that it is, so the fugal “jointure” of beings within the while cannot 
be divided into a series of discrete “nows.” 
 Given Heidegger’s employment of the term Fuge as “jointure” from 
the 1930s onwards, it is quite striking that he should have chosen a 
fugue as his example of meaningful sound irreducible to a configura-
tion of auditory data. This is even more the case when we think that 
one year after The Principle of Reason he will describe “In stillste ruh” 
as a “fugue.” In the George lecture, Fuge as musical form and Fuge 
as jointure are quite explicitly aligned, as George’s “fugue” joins the 
three stanzas into a “rhythmic” unity. Without lapsing into etymologi-
cal opportunism, I would like to pursue exactly what is taking place 
when Heidegger aligns the “jointure” of beings in presence with this 
intricate form of musical composition. 
 In a fugue, one motif (the subject) is developed polyphonically, 
undergoing a series of inversions and modulations, changes of register 
and timbre, but always guided and bounded by a strict forward mo-
tion. Each time the subject returns in a new melodic strand (a voice), 
undergoing inversions and modulations, it is at once linked to and 
di&erentiated from every other voice within the polyphony; moreover, 
each voice, as it enters into the fugue’s polyphonic fabric, advertises 
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its own entry into audibility and at the same time advertises it as an 
entry out of absence. It is notable in this regard that the subjects of 
most of Bach’s fugues took extended upbeats as their starting point, 
as though to perform its movement from silence towards the cadence 
that would signal its “arrival.” And, within the fugue’s broader struc-
ture, the subject’s movement from absence into presence, and its recur-
rence in di&ering forms, cuts against the forward propulsion of the 
fugue as a whole, so as to create a highly wrought temporal frame. 
Without this forward propulsion the counterpoint of these di&erent 
voices would lose its intricacy; without the counterpoint, the forward 
propulsion loses its urgency. 
 But this would suggest that the fugue o&ers two opposed experi-
ences of time: the metronomic rhythm of the time signature and tempo, 
and the fugal rhythm of the plays of similarity and di&erence involved 
in the polyphony itself. It is not simply the di&erent voices that are in 
counterpoint in a fugue, but these two conceptions of time. Might we 
find something similar in Heidegger’s own analyses of poetic rhythm, 
and between the rhythmicity of beings’ entry into appearance on the 
one hand, and the poems’ prosodic patterning on the other? Before o&er-
ing a response to this question, I wish to probe the way that movement 
is thematized in Heidegger’s accounts of the artwork and of language, 
which, we shall see, meet in his readings of poetry. The notion of a fu-
gal “jointure” is central to how he conceives of the “agitated stillness” 
of the artwork, and of the “way-making movement” through which the 
“saying” of language enters into “speech.”
THE MOVEDNESS OF THE ART WORK
In the reading of “In stillste ruh”, we learn of the “rest” of rhythm 
insofar as it structures the movement around it. Here Heidegger is 
drawing on his account of the “rest” or “repose” that in “The Origin 
of the Work of Art” characterises the artwork itself. The temple at 
Paestum attains its “unity” and “self-su7ciency” by virtue of “the 
closed, unitary repose of [its] resting-in-itself.”14 Moreover, it is because 
the work is “solitary,” because it “stands within itself” and “cuts all 
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ties with human beings” that it can constitute a “step into the open,” 
through which it “carries us into this openness and, at the same time, 
out of the realm of the usual.”15 The artwork’s hermetic stillness is 
the way that we can encounter it as a “happening of truth.” Indeed, 
only by exhibiting such stillness can it transform our encounter with 
beings (or, in Heidegger’s terminology, “set up a world”). For both the 
reading of “In stillste ruh” and “Origin,” this rest, far from constitut-
ing the mere absence of motion, indicates “a state of extreme agitation 
[Bewegtheit].”16 In “Origin” this state of agitation is ascribed to a series 
of anterior movements, the “strife” of world and earth, and the counter-
movements of concealing and unconcealing, absencing and presencing. 
If the agitated stillness of the work structures the motion around it, it 
is because it renders manifest the oscillations between presencing and 
absencing through which movement as such becomes discernible. 
 Yet for Heidegger, the artwork does not indicate the dynamics 
of the strife of world and earth so much as instigate it. This happens 
through the artwork’s treatment of the “earth” of its “work-material” 
(that is, its medium). As a “coming-forth concealing” movement, the 
“earth” functions as a limit inherent in the medium, conditioning the 
way this medium can appear within the world of phenomenal experi-
ence.17 As the artwork searches out the limits of its medium, the shape 
of the earth’s “concealing” is modified, and with it the modalities of 
the medium’s self-disclosure (its “coming-forth”) are transformed. For 
as long as the artwork is at work, the shape of the earth-world relation 
continues to shift, continually breaching and reconfiguring its own 
limits, and with it the limits of beings’ self-disclosure as such. This 
engagement with the limits and the concealing movement inhering 
in the medium Heidegger terms a “continually self-surpassing gather-
ing;”18 this allusion towards the revelatory function of logos is central 
to the model of the artwork Heidegger wishes to propose. Addressing 
entities “as” such-and-such within the work (through its depiction, 
for instance), and presenting itself “as” such-and-such (namely, as 
the work that it is), the work at the same time exceeds the very “as”-
structure of this address. 
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 In this, Heidegger points to a constitutive excess within logos itself: 
the work’s ability to “gather” entities into openness depends on its ex-
ceeding the bounds of the open itself.19 The artwork, as a mode of logos, 
continually “strives” to grasp that which recedes into the work-material 
out of which it is fashioned, so as to “gather” beings into presence. 
 This is developed in the discussion of the artwork’s Gestalt: its 
“figure” or singular “look.”20 As the work searches out the limits of 
its work-material, the earth, which, “bearing and rising up, strives to 
preserve its closedness,”21 is “wrested” into the world from which it 
would withdraw. The strife of world and earth is internalized into the 
artwork’s engagement with its medium as a “contest of measure and 
limit,” where the repertoire of means and techniques an art form has 
at its disposal confronts a medium that will resist these techniques. As 
the work contests the limits of its measure, it reflects on this measure, 
and comes to sketch out and to render manifest this contest itself. This 
is as much at work in the painterly perspective of cinquecento Floren-
tine painting, which continually probes and questions its own illusory 
techniques, as it is in Manet’s dismantling of perspective through point-
edly incongruous spatial relations of figures, or Cézanne’s attempt to 
evoke depth through shading and texture rather than through line; it 
is as much at issue in the unsettling e&ect of placing a caesura after 
the eighth syllable in a heroic line in 18th century English verse, as it is 
in the typographical explosion of Mallarmé’s Un coup de dés. In each 
instance, the opposing movements of “gathering” and “self-surpassing” 
are held together in a continual tension; in each instance this tension is 
figured as a “contest of measure and limit.”
 It is this contest which permits the strife to sketch itself out in a 
singular fashion, in what Heidegger calls the “rift-design” (Riß), and to 
embody this “rift-design” in the way the work shows itself as a singular 
configuration of this rift-design: its Gestalt. If the strife of world and 
earth is “fixed in place” in the Gestalt, it must not be stabilized or it will 
lose its strife-character and the work will cease to be “at work.” It is in 
order to explain how it can fix this strife in place without subjecting to 
stasis that Heidegger specifies: “What is here called figure [Gestalt] is 
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the structure [Gefüge] as which the rift joins itself [der Riß sich fügt]. 
This joined rift [gefügte Riß] is the jointure [Fuge] of the shining of 
truth.”22 As the way in which the strife of world and earth remains 
continually in strife, and thereby binds together the “appearance” or 
“shining” [Scheinen] of truth, it is a movement of a movement, the 
articulation of an articulation. Attending to the ways in which the art-
work is constituted by these di&erent movements will allow us to attend 
to the “movedness” of the open as such, as it inflects the presencing of 
beings and the broader oscillations of presence and absence that shape 
of our encounter with these beings, what Sheehan astutely terms their 
“kinetic intelligibility.”23
 To see how this “movedness” or “agitation” [Bewegtheit] inflects the 
artwork’s Gestalt more concretely, an example may help. In Cézanne’s 
Portrait du jardinier Vallier, the arching of the gardener’s shoulders and 
the thickly applied downward brushstrokes of blacks and dark greens 
that make up his coat and waistcoat serve to engender an extraordinary 
sense of weight.24 Set firmly at the centre of the composition, this weight 
serves as a kind of organizing principle for the painting, drawing the 
various other textural movements towards a focal point. In addition to 
being a formal feature, this weight is central to the characterization of 
the painting’s subject. As the focal point of the portrait is displaced from 
Vallier’s face to his shoulders, we intimate his humility and fatigue; as 
he assumes the painting’s compositional weight, he is endowed with a 
pathos of dignity and understated strength. But what is particularly 
striking is how, as the point at which the countermovements of brush-
strokes cohere, Vallier himself becomes uncannily still – indeed, this 
stillness is one of the first things that strikes one when one encounters 
the work. It would seem to accord with what Heidegger identified as 
that “repose which is an inner concentration of motion, hence a highest 
state of agitation.”25 
 It is precisely this inner concentration of motion that Heidegger, 
in an ekphrastic poem about the Vallier portrait written in 1970, ap-
proaches as a Gestalt: 
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Das nachdenksam Gelassens, das inständig 
Stille der Gestalt des alten Gärtners 
Vallier…
The reflective released, the standing-within 
Stillness of the figure of old gardener  
Vallier…26
The “inständig / Stille der Gestalt” evokes a stillness born of, and borne 
by, movement, in which the movement itself is figured, becomes figure. 
It is worth noting here that Gestalt has two senses within Heidegger’s 
account of the artwork. It can either be the look of the artwork as a 
whole, its composition, or it can indicate a particular figure within the 
work – as in this instance, where the “figure” is that of Vallier himself. 
The shape of thinking is the same for both uses of Gestalt: it serves 
as a point of coherence in which the work’s “agitated” crisscrossing of 
movements and textures are joined together. It is as these movements 
cohere, that they a&ord a “standing-within stillness,” that rest which 
structures movement. It is this coherence, moreover, which constitutes 
the artwork’s “jointure of the shining of truth.”
THE WAY-MAKING MOVEMENT
In both “The Origin of the Work of Art” and “Anaximander’s Saying,” 
the term Fuge is employed as a jointure through which the limits of 
a being’s entry into appearance are fixed and the being can appear 
“as” the being it is. For both, Fuge is thematized as a movement, ei-
ther to be thought in terms of the “strife” of earth and world or as 
the construction of a “while” in which beings disclose themselves in a 
temporally bounded presence; for both, its movedness issues from the 
countermovements between presencing and absencing. Both, finally, 
align the “joining” of Fuge with logos. The artwork’s engagement with 
its work-material was described as a “self-surpassing gathering,” whilst 
in “Anaximander’s Saying” Heidegger indicates an intimate relation 
between Fuge and the logos that “gathers” into a “tarrying presence.”27 
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Both the “jointure” of entities into presence and the gathering of logos 
are considered as modes of articulation: bringing entities into an intel-
ligible whole through di&erentiating them. But if jointure and logos 
trace similar movements, then only logos is endowed with linguistic 
valence. In this next section, I wish to probe the movedness of what 
Heidegger identifies within language itself.
 There is a danger in aligning Heidegger’s thinking of logos too 
closely with “language” as a semantic-syntactic system. In Being and 
Time he proposed the existential of “discourse” as a translation for logos, 
the Greeks having “no word for ‘language.’”28 Later he repudiated the 
focus on discourse as existential, as it turned language into “an activity 
of man” rather than attending to its “linguistic essence”;29 and in the 
1939 Aristotle lecture (one of the key texts in his interpretation of logos 
as “gathering”) he says: “Of itself legein has nothing to do with saying 
and with language,” but rather describes “the original and fundamen-
tal relation to beings.”30 In short, Heidegger’s concern is primarily with 
the disclosive function of logos, and not the specificities of written or 
spoken utterance. 
 However, we can also read a more tempered account of the relation 
between verbal language and logos running throughout his work. In 
Being and Time, talking of the movement from the discoveredness of 
the world into linguistic meanings (Bedeutungen), he says: “The mean-
ingful whole of intelligibility is put into words [Wörter]. To meanings, 
words accrue [Den Bedeutungen wachsen Worte zu]. But word-things do 
not get supplied with meanings.”31 What is striking here is not only that 
he uses a figure of accrual or growth [wachsen… zu] to describe mean-
ing production, but that the growth happens within the words them-
selves, as a group of lexical items, Wörter, “grows” into the Worte of 
meaningful verbal comportment.32 And moments later Heidegger will 
argue that discourse can “make known” and “indicate” Dasein’s state-
of-mind through the “intonation, modulation, the tempo of talk,” that 
is, the prosodic coloration of words.33 In both instances, verbal language 
is approached in terms of movement: on the one hand its “growth” 
into meaning, on the other the shape a phrase traces (intonation and 
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modulation) and its accelerations and decelerations (tempo). But this 
poses a problem, as it is not clear how these movements interact with 
the temporality specific to discourse as “presencing.” It seems, even, 
as if there are two incompatible notions of language at work in Be-
ing and Time, which furnish highly divergent experiences of time. We 
find something similar in his later writing when he insists that verbal 
language should be understood as a “sounding word,” anterior to the 
distinction between sound and sense. The basis of this claim is that it 
“is just as much a property of language to sound and ring and vibrate, to 
hover and to tremble, as it is for the spoken words of language to carry 
a meaning.”34 Not only does this mean that prosodic features of verbal 
language cannot be entirely dismissed from the gathering of logos; it 
also means that there is a prosodic movedness of language independent 
of the gathering movement that brings beings into presence.
 How do these two movements interact? To see this we should turn to 
yet another kind of movement by which Heidegger thematizes language: 
the Swabian archaism Be-wëgung, the movement that sets language “on 
its way.” “The Way to Language” is organized around the “guideword”: 
“to bring language to language as language.”35 At first, Heidegger pres-
ents this as a challenge for thinking: how can we say something about 
language when our means to do so are themselves linguistic? And how 
can we speak about language in its “linguistic essence” – bringing lan-
guage to language as language – rather than as a human activity (be 
it expression, representation, or communication), despite the fact that 
talking and thinking are themselves human activities? Heidegger wishes 
to ask what a non-human linguistic essence might be, and to this end 
he sketches the relation between an originary “Saying” [Sagan], which 
functions as a pre-verbal opening of intelligibility, and human verbal 
comportment [Sprechen]. If this would appear to mimic the structure of 
“ontological di&erence,” we should note that Heidegger’s interest is in the 
“unifying element” through which these two apparently opposed poles 
are bound together into one; instead of “saying” being the substrate of 
“speech,” they are two moments within language, which meet when, as 
his famous guideword has it, “language speaks.” 
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 This endows the phrase “to bring language to language as lan-
guage” with a deeper significance: the “bringing” by which “saying” 
enters “speech” might o&er the key to what “language” itself is. But 
this requires that there be a “unifying element” that joins together the 
originary articulation of “saying” with human speech. This will join 
together speech with both the possibilities that belong to speech, and 
the unspoken that bounds it. In his first attempt to grasp this unifying 
element, he sketches “the adjoinment [Gefüge] of a showing in which 
are joined [verfugt] the speakers and their speaking, the spoken and its 
unspoken out of the to-be-spoken.”36 As with ecstatic temporality, Hei-
degger conceives of this unspoken as a double absence. This adjoinment 
will characterize what he subsequently names Sage: that element which 
unifies both the originary saying and human speech as features of lan-
guage. But the “adjoinment” also pre-figures his final claim about how 
language is set on its way. Sage can only unify “saying” and “speech” 
if these two are appropriate for, and appropriable by, one another. He 
thus concludes: “Ereignis gathers together the design of saying [Sage] 
and unfolds it into the structure [Gefüge] of a manifold showing.”37 
Ereignis, as a way-making movement, gathers language into a unified 
whole [Sage], so that it might gather beings into presence. Whence final 
revision of the guideword: “The way-making movement [Be-wëgung] 
brings language (linguistic essence) as language (Sage) into language 
(the sounding word).”38 The way-making movement is not simply ki-
netic, but, as Thomas Sheehan has observed, dynamic.39
 What relation does this way-making movement bear to the prosodic 
movement of speech? In discussing the “site” of Trakl’s poetry in the 
1953 lecture, Heidegger hints at a response. The distinction between 
the “site of Trakl’s poetry” [das Gedicht], that one poetic statement 
which binds all of Trakl’s poetry together as a singular oeuvre, and 
the individual poems [Dichtungen] that make up his poetic output, is 
akin to that between “saying” and “speech.” Neither individually nor 
as a totality do the Dichtungen articulate this statement completely in 
and of themselves; rather, we must trace within the poems a shared 
source out of which they arise, a source which continually pervades and 
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animates the poems, and towards which they continually signal, even 
if only obliquely. Here I reproduce in full the passage cited partially in 
the introduction.
From the site of the poem there rises the wave that in 
each instance moves his Saying [Sagen] as poetic. But 
that wave, far from leaving the site behind, in its rise 
causes all the movement of Saying [Bewegen der Sage] 
to flow back to its ever more hidden source. The site of 
the poem, as the source of the animating wave, holds 
within it the veiled essence of what – to metaphysical-
aesthetic representation – can at best appear as rhythm.
To trace the originary site out of which the poems stem requires that 
we grasp the animation underlying each poem; not only the wave upon 
which the poems flow, but the source of that wave – what first endows 
the poems with their animation. The movement of saying into speech is 
thematized in the same way as in “The Way to Language.” There Sage 
transports the pre-verbal Sagen into the verbal Sprechen of the poem. 
Yet here it attains a specifically rhythmic valence: what “rhythm” 
would reveal is the very impulse into animation that lies within Sage.
 But the precise role of prosody in Heidegger’s argument (what he 
here terms “rhythm”) is somewhat ambiguous. In his seminal essay on 
this topic, David Farrell Krell noted that the animating wave concerns 
“the peculiar binding power of language,” a power which lies “beyond 
the mere linkage of syllables, or even of words and things, a bind-
ing power beyond both ‘naming’ and ‘predicating.’”40 Krell thus sum-
marizes: “Rhythm has essentially nothing to do with the conformity 
of spoken or written language to inherited standards of measure and 
versification. It does have to do with the intrinsic motion and anima-
tion of language as such.”41 But can the two be so neatly separated? 
That is, if “the source of the animating wave” can “best appear as 
rhythm” to “metaphysical-aesthetic representation,” then in order to 
grasp this animation of language from within the epoch of metaphys-
ics, we should attend to the poem’s rhythm. Throughout his work Trakl 
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employs meter and rhyme, extracting the sounds of words and syllables 
from their sense in order to create sonorous patterns. He too is con-
fined within that “notion of language that has prevailed for thousands 
of years.” Nevertheless, Heidegger suggests, these same rhythms will 
allow his poems to bear witness to the animation of language that 
pervades them and yet withdraws from their grasp. 
 This would mean that the poem’s “linkage” of accentual feet would 
render manifest an anterior binding power of language. The poem’s 
prosodic rhythms, in other words, become a point at which “metaphys-
ical-aesthetic representation” exceeds its own representation. But it also 
means that at work in the poem will be two competing, and incompat-
ible, experiences of movement: as it were rhythm and prosody. This 
recalls our observation about the two competing temporalities at work 
in the fugue itself: the series of “nows” of its time signature, and the 
entry of each instance of each voice into the “while” of polyphonic 
texture. Might these two diverging experiences of movement inflect 
not only Heidegger’s exposition of poetic rhythm, but also the way that 
he reads poetic rhythms? This will be the topic of the final section.
RHY THM AND PROSODY
Heidegger, notoriously, rarely discusses “form” in his readings of po-
etry; and yet there are some powerful exceptions to this rule. I will 
focus on two of them, twenty years apart. The first, from the Introduc-
tion to Metaphysics, is of the first choral ode from Sophocles’ Antigone; 
the second is the reading of George’s “In stillste ruh,” whose “rhythm” 
of tropes is portrayed as a “fugue.” Sophocles portrays man as the “most 
uncanny” [das Unheimlichste], insofar as he is being torn from the earth 
that would otherwise be “home.” Heidegger observes: 
The ode … sings of breaking forth upon the groundless 
waves, of giving up firm land. This breakaway does 
not take place upon the cheerful smoothness of gleam-
ing water but amid the winter storm. The saying of 
this breakaway is situated in the law of motion of the 
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word- and verse-structure [das Bewegungsgesetz der 
Wort- und Versfügung], just as the chorei in verse 336 is 
placed at the point where the meter [Versmaß] shifts.42
A few minutes earlier, Heidegger had read the ode aloud in the Greek, so 
that his audience would have heard the metrical shift for themselves.43 
It is immediately striking that this shift is considered not simply to 
emphasize or qualify the meaning, nor to heighten our attentiveness to 
what is said, nor “echo” its sense; rather, it changes quite fundamentally 
the meaning of the word chorei. In the opening translation, chorei is 
given as kreuzt (rendered by Polt and Fried as “cruises”44), but after 
attending to its metrical position, Heidegger can continue:
[Man] gives up the place, he heads out – and ventures to en-
ter the superior power of the sea’s placeless flood. The word 
stands like a pillar in the construction of these verses.45
“Like a pillar,” the word stands at rest and supports the weight of all 
that surrounds it. The resemblance to the temple in “The Origin of 
the Work of Art” (which he was working on at the same time), whose 
self-subsistence lies in its standing there in a repose that structures 
the relations around it, is striking. In both, we encounter an “inner 
concentration” which, far from indicating an absence of movedness, 
constitutes its nodal point. The shift that takes place on the word chorei 
might at first advertise itself as a metrical feature, but it subsequently 
reaches beyond its local metrical function to render manifest the “law 
of motion” governing the meter as a whole. This moment is what Hei-
degger in “Origin” termed the artwork’s Gestalt: a moment of coherence 
where the work’s countermovements are joined together in agitated 
stillness. The ode’s prosody, it would seem, can use this moment of dis-
sonance or transformation to grasp its own movedness.
 In the reading of Sophocles’ ode, Heidegger appeals to a metrical 
feature but does not ask what it is about the meter that allows it to 
transform the meaning of the strophe as a whole. When he comes to 
discuss “In stillste ruh,” the question of rhythm as a jointure becomes 
the center of his analysis, but in so doing the account of rhythm comes 
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to be troubled by the poem he reads. “In stillste ruh” itself probes the 
relation between rest and movement, as its eponymous rest is broken by 
“a sight which / With undreamed terror / Troubles the secure soul.” 
In stillste ruh 
Besonnenen tags 
Bricht jäh ein blick 
Der unerahnten schrecks 
Die sichre seele stört  
So wie auf höhn 
Der feste stamm 
Stolz reglos ragt 
Und dann noch spät ein sturm 
Ihn bis zum boden beugt:  
So wie das meer 
Mit gellem laut 
Mit wildem prall 
Noch einmal in die lang 
Verlassne muschel stößt.
 
In stillest rest 
Of a musing day 
Suddenly breaks a sight which 
With undreamed terror 
Troubles the secure soul  
As when on the heights 
The solid stem 
Towers motionless in pride 
And then late a storm 
Bends it to the ground: 
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As when the sea 
With shrill scream 
With wild crash 
Once again into the long 
Abandoned shell thrusts46
George’s and Heidegger’s thematization of movement and rest seem 
at first blush diametrically opposed. For George, the destruction of 
stillness would evoke the vulnerability of man faced with nature; for 
Heidegger, the poem successfully embodies a resting-within-itself. We 
might be tempted to say, as Paul de Man did of Heidegger’s Hölderlin’s 
readings, that George “says exactly the opposite of what Heidegger makes 
him say.”47 Yet Heidegger’s central observation about the poem’s com-
positional structure identifies a current within the poem that would 
counter this first interpretation. The colon at the end of the second 
stanza draws the second “As when” back to the first stanza. As a result, 
the poet, bent “to the ground as the storm bends the tree” in the second 
stanza, becomes “open” for the third stanza, where “the sea thrusts its 
unfathomable voice into the poet’s ears which are called ‘the long aban-
doned shell.’”48 The third stanza, Heidegger argues, has engendered an 
openness to the world (somewhat akin to Dasein’s “resolve” in Being 
and Time) in which the poem’s “rest” is ultimately restored. Within the 
argument of Heidegger’s reading, this shift is crucial: the openness the 
poem engenders will permit the “renunciation” that George, in “Das 
Wort,” searches after. 
 But what of the “rhythmic” aspect of this poem? In the introduction 
I noted that situating the poem’s rhythm in its tropological movement 
can be read as a denigration of the literary-critical category of prosody; 
but prosody cannot be so easily supressed. Heidegger enumerates the 
poem’s figures thus: Sichre Seele, jäher Blick, Stamm und Sturm, Meer 
und Muschel; the pattern of two stressed syllables separated by one 
unstress mimics, and even condenses, the halting syncopations through 
which the poem both sets up a forward motion and presses back in on 
itself.49 Indeed, in order to retain this pattern, Heidegger undoes the 
contraction of jäher into jäh, and turns it from an adverb describing 
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the “break” into adjective describing “sight.” Heidegger’s adherence 
to the poem’s prosodic movement would distort its grammatical move-
ment; contracting jäher into jäh might reproduce the regularity of the 
poem’s prosody but, rendering an adverb an adjective, it imposes upon 
the poem a grammatical stasis. In addition to reading “rest” back into 
the poem through this openness to the world, his enumeration of the 
poem’s figural movement brings its prosody and grammar to “rest.” 
 The power of this particular reading lies not simply in its being a 
compelling exegesis of the poem, but in its performing a compelling en-
counter with the poem. And moreover, this encounter with the poem is 
prosodic. The “renunciation” the poem engenders through its openness, 
Heidegger concludes, is “no refusal of a claim but the transformation of 
the saying into the almost concealed roaring songlike echo of an unsay-
able Saga [die Wandlung des Sagens in den fast verborgen rauschenden 
liedhaften Widerklang einer unsägliche Sage].”50 The poem has become 
nothing less than an allegory for the movement from the pre-verbal 
Sagen into the poem’s speech; in its rhythmic jointure, it renders audible 
the Sage that joins the two together. Just as in the programmatic discus-
sion of Trakl’s “poetic site,” this movement into speech is experienced 
as rhythm – but here it has been internalized into Heidegger’s own 
rhythms. Earlier we noted how Heidegger’s writing echoed the ebb and 
flow of George’s stress-unstress syncopations; here, by contrast, we en-
counter a near-paratactic accumulation of adjectives, culminating in an 
almost “dactylic” progression of the cadence – rauschenden liedhaften 
Widerklang einer unsäglichen Sage – whose prosodic overflow seems 
like a release of the tension the poem had built up.51 At this crucial 
juncture, Heidegger’s writing is remarkably unlike George’s poem. The 
poem’s kinesis, then, its “joining rest,” plays itself out through the coun-
terpoint of George’s clipped dimeters and Heidegger’s dactylic overflow.
 Heidegger’s reading of George’s “fugal” rhythms involves him in a 
fugal interaction between the movement he wishes to trace from Sagen 
to Sprechen and the prosodic movement that marks his encounter with 
the poem. In “Origin” Heidegger argues that, for the work to remain 
at work requires that the artwork be taken up by its “preservers,” who 
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“stand within the openness of beings that happens in the work.”52 It is 
precisely such a preservation that is taking place in Heidegger’s pro-
sodic encounter with “In stillste ruh,” and if this a&ords a momentary 
glimpse of “the almost concealed roaring songlike echo of an unsayable 
Saga,” then it is precisely as the prosodic encounter exceeds itself and 
opens up a rhythmic jointure binding the two. But this also means 
that, despite Heidegger’s somewhat patrician disdain for literary criti-
cism, the categories through which literary critics conceive of rhythm 
become central to our grasping the originary movedness that George’s 
poem would engender. Prosody is dynamized, not only in that it ceases 
to be the mere patterning of accents and syllables, but also in that more 
precise sense in which Heidegger translates dynamis: it sets thinking 
on its way.
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